This paper focuses on the formal assessment of the properties of cooperation enforcement mechanisms used to detect and prevent selfish behavior of nodes forming a mobile ad hoc network. In the first part, we demonstrate the requirement for a cooperation enforcement mechanism using cooperative game theory that allows us to determine a lower bound on the size of coalitions of cooperating nodes. In the second part, using non-cooperative game theory, we compare our cooperation enforcement mechanism CORE to other popular mechanisms. Under the hypothesis of perfect monitoring of node behavior, CORE appears to be equivalent to a wide range of history-based strategies like tit-for-tat. Further, adopting a more realistic assumption taking into account imperfect monitoring due to probable communication errors, the non-cooperative model puts in evidence the superiority of CORE over other history-based schemes.
Analysis of coalition formation and cooperation strategies in mobile ad hoc networks
Ad Hoc Networks, Volume 3, N°2, March 2005
© Elsevier. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in Ad Hoc Networks, Volume 3, N°2, March 2005 and is available at : http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2004.07.006
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