Clickjacking is a web-based attack that has recently received a wide media coverage. In a clickjacking attack, a malicious page is constructed such that it tricks victims into clicking on an element of a different page that is only barely (or not at all) visible. By stealing the victim’s clicks, an attacker could force the user to perform an unintended action that is advantageous for the attacker (e.g., initiate an online money transaction). Although clickjacking has been the subject of many discussions and alarming reports, it is currently unclear to what extent clickjacking is being used by attackers in the wild, and how significant the attack is for the security of Internet users.
In this paper, we propose a novel solution for the automated and efficient detection of clickjacking attacks. We describe the system that we designed, implemented and deployed to analyze over a million unique web pages. The experiments show that our approach is feasible in practice. Also, the empirical study that we conducted on a large number of popular websites suggests that clickjacking has not yet been largely adopted by attackers on the Internet.
