Distance-bounding proof of knowledge to avoid real-time attacks
SEC 2005, 20th IFIP International Information Security Conference, May 30-June 1, 2005, Chiba, Japan
Traditional authentication is based on proving the knowledge of a private key corresponding to a given public key. In some situations, especially in the context of pervasive computing, it is additionally required to verify the physical proximity of the authenticated party in order to avoid a set of real-time attacks. Brands and Chaum proposed distance-bounding protocols as a way to compute a practical upper bound on the distance between a prover and a verifier during an authentication process. Their protocol prevents frauds where an intruder sits between a legitimate prover and a verifier and succeeds to perform the distance-bounding process. However, frauds where a malicious prover and an intruder collaborate to cheat a verifier have been left as an open issue. In this paper, we provide a solution preventing both types of attacks.
| Mots Clés: | real-time attack;distance-bounding;authentication;proof of knowledge |
| Type: | Conférence |
| Langue: | English |
| Ville: | Chiba |
| Pays: | JAPON |
| Date: | Mai 2005 |
| Département: | Réseaux et Sécurité |
| Eurecom ref: | 1607 |
| Copyright: | © IFIP. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in SEC 2005, 20th IFIP International Information Security Conference, May 30-June 1, 2005, Chiba, Japan and is available at : |
| Bibtex: | @inproceedings{EURECOM+1607, year = {2005}, title = {{D}istance-bounding proof of knowledge to avoid real-time attacks}, author = {{B}ussard, {L}aurent and {B}agga, {W}alid}, booktitle = {{SEC} 2005, 20th {IFIP} {I}nternational {I}nformation {S}ecurity {C}onference, {M}ay 30-{J}une 1, 2005, {C}hiba, {J}apan}, address = {{C}hiba, {JAPON}}, month = {05}, url = {http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/1607} } |
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