Graduate School and Research Center In communication systems

Distance-bounding proof of knowledge to avoid real-time attacks

Bussard, Laurent;Bagga, Walid

IFIP SEC 2005, 20th IFIP International Information Security Conference, May 30-June 1, 2005, Chiba, Japan

Traditional authentication is based on proving the knowledge of a private key corresponding to a given public key. In some situations, especially in the context of pervasive computing, it is additionally required to verify the physical proximity of the authenticated party in order to avoid a set of real-time attacks. Brands and Chaum proposed distance-bounding protocols as a way to compute a practical upper bound on the distance between a prover and a verifier during an authentication process. Their protocol prevents frauds where an intruder sits between a legitimate prover and a verifier and succeeds to perform the distance-bounding process. However, frauds where a malicious prover and an intruder collaborate to cheat a verifier have been left as an open issue. In this paper, we provide a solution preventing both types of attacks.

Document Bibtex

Keywords:real-time attack;distance-bounding;authentication;proof of knowledge
Type:Conference
Language:English
City:Chiba
Country:JAPAN
Date:
Department:Networking and Security
Eurecom ref:1607
Copyright: © IFIP. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in IFIP SEC 2005, 20th IFIP International Information Security Conference, May 30-June 1, 2005, Chiba, Japan and is available at :
Bibtex: @inproceedings{EURECOM+1607, year = {2005}, title = {{D}istance-bounding proof of knowledge to avoid real-time attacks}, author = {{B}ussard, {L}aurent and {B}agga, {W}alid}, booktitle = {{IFIP} {SEC} 2005, 20th {IFIP} {I}nternational {I}nformation {S}ecurity {C}onference, {M}ay 30-{J}une 1, 2005, {C}hiba, {J}apan}, address = {{C}hiba, {JAPAN}}, month = {05}, url = {http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/1607} }