The mother of all leakages: How to simulate noisy leakages via bounded leakage (almost) for free

Brian, Gianluca; Faonio, Antonio; Obremski, Maciej; Ribeiro, João; Simkin, Mark; Skórski, Maciej; Venturi, Daniele
Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1246, 8 October 2020

We show that noisy leakage can be simulated in the information-theoretic setting using a single query of bounded leakage, up to a small statistical simulation error and a slight loss in the leakage parameter. The latter holds true in particular for one of the most used noisyleakage models, where the noisiness is measured using the conditional average min-entropy (Naor and Segev, CRYPTO’09 and SICOMP’12). Our reductions between noisy and bounded leakage are achieved in two steps. First, we put forward a new leakage model (dubbed the dense leakage model) and prove that dense leakage can be simulated in the information-theoretic setting using a single query of bounded leakage, up to small statistical distance. Second, we show that the most common noisy-leakage models fall within the class of dense leakage, with good parameters. We also provide a complete picture of the relationships between different noisy-leakage models, and prove a lower bound on the amount of bounded leakage required for simulation with subconstant error, showing that our reductions are nearly optimal. Our result finds applications to leakage-resilient cryptography, where we are often able to lift security in the presence of bounded leakage to security in the presence of noisy leakage, both in the information-theoretic and in the computational setting. Additionally, we show how to use lower bounds in communication complexity to prove that bounded-collusion protocols (Kumar, Meka, and Sahai, FOCS’19) for certain functions do not only require long transcripts, but also necessarily need to reveal enough information about the inputs.


Type:
Rapport
Date:
2020-10-07
Department:
Sécurité numérique
Eurecom Ref:
6372
Copyright:
IACR

PERMALINK : https://www.eurecom.fr/publication/6372