Tracker : security and privacy for RFID-based supply chains

Blass, Erik-Oliver; Elkhiyaoui, Kaoutar; Molva, Refik
NDSS 2011, 18th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 6-9 February 2011, San Diego, CA, USA

The counterfeiting of pharmaceutics or luxury objects is a major threat to supply chains today. As different facilities of a supply chain are distributed and difficult to monitor, malicious adversaries can inject fake objects into the supply chain. This paper presents TRACKER, a protocol for object genuineness verification in RFID-based supply chains. More precisely, TRACKER allows to securely identify which (legitimate) path an object/tag has taken through a supply chain. TRACKER provides privacy: an adversary can neither learn details about an object’s path, nor can it trace and link objects in the supply chain. TRACKER’s security and privacy is based on an extension of polynomial signature techniques for run-time fault detection using homomorphic encryption. Contrary to related work, RFID tags in this paper are not required to perform any computation, but only feature a few bytes of storage such as ordinary EPC Class 1 Gen 2 tags. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The counterfeiting of pharmaceutics or luxury objects is

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

a major threat to supply chains today. As different facilities

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of a supply chain are distributed and difficult to monitor,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

malicious adversaries can inject fake objects into the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

supply chain. This paper presents

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

for object genuineness verification in RFID-based supply

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

chains. More precisely,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

which (legitimate) path an object/tag has taken through

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

a supply chain.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

can neither learn details about an object's path, nor can

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

it trace and link objects in the supply chain.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

security and privacy is based on an extension of polynomial

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

signature techniques for run-time fault detection using

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

homomorphic encryption. Contrary to related work, RFID

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

tags in this paper are

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

but only feature a few bytes of storage such as ordinary

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EPC Class 1 Gen 2 tags.


Type:
Conference
City:
San Diego
Date:
2011-02-06
Department:
Digital Security
Eurecom Ref:
3233
Copyright:
© ISOC. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in NDSS 2011, 18th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 6-9 February 2011, San Diego, CA, USA and is available at :

PERMALINK : https://www.eurecom.fr/publication/3233