Ecole d'ingénieur et centre de recherche en Sciences du numérique

Exploitation and mitigation of authentication schemes based on device-public information

Bianchi, Antonio; Gustafson, Eric; Fratantonio, Yanick; Kruegel, Christopher; Vigna, Giovanni

ACSAC 2017, 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, December 4-8, 2017, Orlando, FL, USA

Today's mobile applications increasingly rely on communication with a remote backend service to perform many critical functions, including handling user-specific information. This implies that some form of authentication will be used to associate a user with their actions and data. Schemes involving tedious account creation procedures can represent "friction'' for users. Consequently, many applications are moving toward alternative solutions, some of which, while increasing usability, sacrifice security.  This paper focuses on a new trend of authentication schemes based on what we called "device-public'' information, which consist of properties and data that an application on the device can obtain. While convenient to users (since they require little or no interaction), these schemes are vulnerable by design, since all the needed information to authenticate a user is available to any app installed on the device. An attacker with a malicious app on a user's device could easily hijack the user's account, steal private information, send (and receive) messages on behalf of the user, or steal valuable virtual goods.  To demonstrate how easily these vulnerabilities can be weaponized, we developed a generic exploitation technique that first mines all relevant data from a victim's phone, and then transfers and injects them into an attacker's phone to fool apps into granting access to the victim's account. Moreover, we developed a dynamic analysis detection system to automatically highlight problematic apps. Our analysis tool identified 41 vulnerable apps among 1000 popular applications, including the popular messaging apps WhatsApp and Viber. Finally, our work proposes solutions to this issue.

Document Doi Bibtex

Titre:Exploitation and mitigation of authentication schemes based on device-public information
Mots Clés:mobile-security, vulnerability, authentication
Type:Conférence
Langue:English
Ville:Orlando
Pays:ÉTATS-UNIS
Date:
Département:Sécurité numérique
Eurecom ref:5374
Copyright: © ACM, 2017. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in ACSAC 2017, 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, December 4-8, 2017, Orlando, FL, USA http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3134600.3134615
Bibtex: @inproceedings{EURECOM+5374, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3134600.3134615}, year = {2017}, title = {{E}xploitation and mitigation of authentication schemes based on device-public information}, author = {{B}ianchi, {A}ntonio and {G}ustafson, {E}ric and {F}ratantonio, {Y}anick and {K}ruegel, {C}hristopher and {V}igna, {G}iovanni}, booktitle = {{ACSAC} 2017, 33rd {A}nnual {C}omputer {S}ecurity {A}pplications {C}onference, {D}ecember 4-8, 2017, {O}rlando, {FL}, {USA}}, address = {{O}rlando, {\'{E}}{TATS}-{UNIS}}, month = {12}, url = {http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/5374} }
Voir aussi: