Ecole d'ingénieur et centre de recherche en Sciences du numérique

ROTIV: RFID ownership transfer with issuer verification

Elkhiyaoui, Kaoutar; Blass, Erik-Oliver; Molva, Refik

Cryptology ePrint Archive : Report 2010/634, December 2010

RFID tags travel between partner sites in a supply chain. For privacy reasons, each partner owns the tags present at his site, i.e., the owner is the only entity able to authenticate his tags. However, when passing tags on to the next partner in the supply chain, ownership of the old partner is transferred to the new partner. In this paper, we propose ROTIV, a protocol that allows for secure ownership transfer against some malicious owners. Furthermore, ROTIV offers issuer verification to prevent malicious partners from injecting fake tags not originally issued by some trusted party. As part of ownership, ROTIV provides a constant-time, privacy-preserving authentication. ROTIV's main idea is to combine an HMAC-based authentication with tag key and state updates during ownership transfer. To assure privacy, ROTIV implements tag state re-encryption techniques and key update techniques, performed on the reader. ROTIV is designed for lightweight tags tags are only required to evaluate a hash function.

Document Bibtex

Titre:ROTIV: RFID ownership transfer with issuer verification
Département:Sécurité numérique
Eurecom ref:3309
Copyright: IACR
Bibtex: @techreport{EURECOM+3309, year = {2010}, title = {{ROTIV}: {RFID} ownership transfer with issuer verification}, author = {{E}lkhiyaoui, {K}aoutar and {B}lass, {E}rik-{O}liver and {M}olva, {R}efik}, number = {EURECOM+3309}, month = {12}, institution = {Eurecom}, url = {},, }
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