Evolutionary game for peer-to-peer storage audits
Research report RR-08-225
The paper describes an evolutionary game model of a P2P storage system. By studying the equilibrium point of the game, we demonstrate that an audit-based strategy, where audits are used to decide whether to cooperate with a given peer or not, may win or dominate free-riders peers that are using the system without contributing to it. This desirable equilibrium is reached for certain conditions and system’s parameters revealed in the paper
| Type: | Rapport |
| Langue: | English |
| Date: | Juillet 2008 |
| Département: | Réseaux et Sécurité |
| Eurecom ref: | 2569 |
| Copyright: | © EURECOM. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in Research report RR-08-225 and is available at : |
| Bibtex: | @techreport{EURECOM+2569, year = {2008}, title = {{E}volutionary game for peer-to-peer storage audits}, author = {{O}ualha, {N}ouha and {R}oudier, {Y}ves}, number = {EURECOM+2569}, month = {07}, institution = {Eurecom}, url = {http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/2569},, } |
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