Distance-bounding proof of knowledge protocols to avoid terrorist fraud attacks

Bussard, Laurent;Bagga, Walid
Research report RR-04-109

Real-time frauds can be applied against numerous zero-knowledge or
minimal disclosure identification schemes that protect physical services,
be it opening a door or verifying attributes of a certified device.
In [4], Brands and Chaum proposed distance-bounding protocols to
forbid mafia fraud attacks and let the terrorist fraud attack as an open
issue. In this paper, we describe an extension of the initial scheme in
order to forbid both mafia and terrorist fraud attacks.


Type:
Rapport
Date:
2004-05-14
Department:
Sécurité numérique
Eurecom Ref:
1408
Copyright:
© EURECOM. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in Research report RR-04-109 and is available at :

PERMALINK : https://www.eurecom.fr/publication/1408