Ecole d'ingénieur et centre de recherche en télécommunications
Distance-bounding proof of knowledge protocols to avoid terrorist fraud attacks
Research report RR-04-109
Real-time frauds can be applied against numerous zero-knowledge or minimal disclosure identification schemes that protect physical services, be it opening a door or verifying attributes of a certified device. In [4], Brands and Chaum proposed distance-bounding protocols to forbid mafia fraud attacks and let the terrorist fraud attack as an open issue. In this paper, we describe an extension of the initial scheme in order to forbid both mafia and terrorist fraud attacks.
| Mots Clés: | terrorist fraud;mafia fraud;distance-bounding;proof of knowledge |
| Type: | Rapport |
| Langue: | English |
| Date: | Mai 2004 |
| Département: | Réseaux et Sécurité |
| Eurecom ref: | 1408 |
| Copyright: | © EURECOM. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in Research report RR-04-109 and is available at : |
| Bibtex: | @techreport{EURECOM+1408, year = {2004}, title = {{D}istance-bounding proof of knowledge protocols to avoid terrorist fraud attacks}, author = {{B}ussard, {L}aurent and {B}agga, {W}alid}, number = {EURECOM+1408}, month = {05}, institution = {Eurecom}, url = {http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/1408},, } |
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