Ecole d'ingénieur et centre de recherche en Sciences du numérique

Analysis of cooperation strategies in mobile ad hoc networks with imperfect monitoring

Michiardi, Pietro;Molva, Refik

Research report RR-04-099

This paper focuses on the formal assessment of the properties of cooperation enforcement mechanisms used to detect and prevent selfish behavior of nodes forming a mobile ad hoc network. In the first part, we demonstrate the requirement for a cooperation enforcement mechanism using cooperative game theory that allows us to determine a lower bound on the size of coalitions of cooperating nodes. In the second part, using non-cooperative game theory, we compare our cooperation enforcement mechanism CORE to other popular mechanisms. Under the hypothesis of perfect monitoring of node behavior, CORE appears to be equivalent to a wide range of history-based strategies like tit-for-tat. Further, adopting a more realistic assumption taking into account imperfect monitoring due to probable communication errors, the non-cooperative model puts in evidence the superiority of CORE over other history-based schemes.

Document Bibtex

Titre:Analysis of cooperation strategies in mobile ad hoc networks with imperfect monitoring
Mots Clés:cooperation enforcement;game theory;complex strategies;evolution of cooperation
Type:Rapport
Langue:English
Date:
Département:Sécurité numérique
Eurecom ref:1340
Copyright: © EURECOM. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in Research report RR-04-099 and is available at :
Bibtex: @techreport{EURECOM+1340, year = {2004}, title = {{A}nalysis of cooperation strategies in mobile ad hoc networks with imperfect monitoring}, author = {{M}ichiardi, {P}ietro and {M}olva, {R}efik}, number = {EURECOM+1340}, month = {02}, institution = {Eurecom}, url = {http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/1340},, }
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