Graduate School and Research Center in Digital Sciences

QSOR: Quantum-safe onion routing

Tujner, Zsolt; Rooijakkers, Thomas; van Heesch, Maran; Önen, Melek

Submitted on ArXiV, 10 January 2020

In this work, we propose a study on the use of post-quantum cryptographic primitives for the Tor network in order to make it safe in a quantum world. With this aim, the underlying keying material has first been analysed. We observe that breaking the security of the algorithms/protocols that use long- and medium-term keys (usually RSA keys) have the highest impact in security. Therefore, we investigate the cost of quantum-safe variants. These include key generation, key encapsulation and decapsulation. Six different post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that ensure level 1 NIST security are evaluated. We further target the Tor circuit creation operation and evaluate the overhead of the post-quantum variant. This comparative study is performed through a reference implementation based on SweetOnions that simulates Tor with slight simplifications. We show that a quantum-safe Tor circuit creation is possible and suggest two versions - one that can be used in a purely quantum-safe setting, and one that can be used in a hybrid setting.

Document Arxiv Bibtex

Title:QSOR: Quantum-safe onion routing
Keywords:Tor, anonymous routing, post-quantum cryptography
Type:Conference
Language:English
City:
Date:
Department:Digital Security
Eurecom ref:6160
Copyright: © EURECOM. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in Submitted on ArXiV, 10 January 2020 and is available at :
Bibtex: @inproceedings{EURECOM+6160, year = {2020}, title = {{QSOR}: {Q}uantum-safe onion routing}, author = {{T}ujner, {Z}solt and {R}ooijakkers, {T}homas and van {H}eesch, {M}aran and {\"{O}}nen, {M}elek}, booktitle = {{S}ubmitted on {A}r{X}i{V}, 10 {J}anuary 2020}, address = {}, month = {01}, url = {http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/6160} }
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