SysML-Sec: A SysML Environment for the Design and Development of Secure Embedded Systems

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Abstract: We introduce SysML-Sec, a new SysML environment aimed at making security experts collaborate with system designers at all methodological stages of the design and development of an embedded system. SysML-Sec is also meant to support the assessment of the impact of security over safety. Security and safety concerns are captured in extended SysML diagrams elaborated according to an iterative process centered around the software/hardware partitioning of the architecture. The requirements captured are derived into security and cryptographic mechanisms as well as into security properties that can be formally verified.

Keywords: SysML, security, embedded systems, model driven engineering.

1 Introduction

Most contributions around Model Driven Engineering (MDE) now offer appropriate methodologies and modeling environments for designing safe, complex, distributed, and real-time embedded systems. The analysis of timing constraints, scheduling, resource allocation, and concurrency are commonly handled by these environments. In contrast, security has long been considered only in retrospect, especially after serious flaws are discovered. Security issues have in particular only recently become a major concern in embedded systems. However, the size, heterogeneity, and communication features of modern embedded systems make it compelling to develop a suitable engineering environment to more explicitly define security objectives and threats and to implement countermeasures. The system complexity also makes it worthwhile verifying that requirements are consistent with and satisfied by a candidate design before any commitment to a particular implementation is made.

Contributions in the field of security-aware MDE commonly address one specific methodological stage (e.g., requirements [NNY10], verification [Ton93]), or one specific application domain (e.g., proofs over cryptographic protocols [ABB+05] [ORR00]), or are focused on the immediate modeling of security mechanisms [Jür02] rather than the definition of these mechanisms based on a clearly defined methodology.

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This paper introduces SysML-Sec, a new SysML environment with a more holistic approach, which introduces both customized SysML diagrams for security matters and an associated methodology. We intend SysML-Sec to make it possible for security experts to intervene on the design and development of an embedded system together with system designers. The SysML-Sec methodology and diagrams have been developed and experimented in the scope of the FP7 European project EVITA. EVITA defines a secure architecture for automotive embedded systems. The definition, design and validation of this architecture was performed with the methodology which is presented in this paper. Thus, more than 20 use cases (notably an emergency braking case) were taken into account for that purpose, and the diagrams in this paper are directly excerpted from this case study.

2 Hardware / Software Partitioning in Embedded Systems

Software-centric systems are commonly designed with a V-cycle, with building stages (requirements, analysis, design, implementation) followed with verification stages (e.g., tests, formal proofs). For embedded systems, the V-cycle can obviously start only once functions have been partitioned into software and hardware. System partitioning usually relies on the Y-chart approach [BWH+03]. The result of this process is an optimal hardware / software architecture with regards to criteria at stake for that particular system (e.g., cost, performance, etc.) and comprising: (1) Applications are first described as abstract communicating tasks: tasks represent functions independently from their implementation form. (2) Hardware architectures are described as a set of abstract execution nodes (e.g., CPU with operating systems and middleware, hardware accelerators), communication nodes (e.g., buses), and storage nodes (e.g., memories). (3) A mapping model defines how tasks and communications between tasks are assigned to computation and communication or storage elements, respectively. For example, a task mapped on a hardware accelerator is a hardware-implemented function whereas a task mapped over a CPU is a software implemented function.

We have already defined several MDE-based environment to support the development of embedded systems (the DIPLODOCUS UML profile [AMAB+06], the AVATAR [ADSS11] SysML environment, and the TEPE [KAD11] environment). All those environments are implemented within the free software TTool [Apv13]. TTool automates the formal verification and simulation of models and provides live feedback to UML diagrams. SysML can be used with those environments and tooling to describe the partitioning issues discussed above together with performance and safety requirements.

Security issues are however not addressed by these profiles. We designed the SysML-Sec environment in order to make it possible to describe such issues together with partitioning requirements, as further discussed in [RIA13]. In particular, our extensions bridge the gap between goal-oriented descriptions of security requirements and attacks, and the fine-grained representation of assets based on the software / hardware architecture (and their model-driven analysis).

3 The SysML-Sec Approach

An increasing number of embedded systems have become communicating artifacts, feature new interactions with their immediate environment or with backend systems, and are thus
exposed to criminals. For example, attacks have been shown to be possible on set-top-boxes like Microsoft’s XBox [Hua02] or ADSL routers [Ass12], mobile appliances [Ess11], avionics [Tes13], or automotive systems [HKD11] to cite but a few. Many of these security issues reflect either the exploitation of low-level vulnerabilities, which might often be addressed with appropriate programming practices and specific component tests, or design flaws due to an insufficient understanding of the mapping of functional or security logical components to the hardware architecture. We claim that the SysML-Sec Model-Driven Engineering approach makes it possible to perform an appropriate system analysis in both directions, and to describe both security threats and security objectives.

SysML-Sec first of all guides and increases the potential for collaboration between system engineers and security experts throughout the entire embedded system lifecycle. This has been the reason for our adoption of the OMG standards, and more specifically SysML, which are quite widespread in the embedded system world today. Our approach furthermore provides detailed representations of the security threats and security requirements compatible with the MDE methodology used and making it possible to adopt a stepwise refinement approach to the definition of both the functional and the security architecture. This refinement should also make it possible to bridge the gap between initial high-level requirements and the definition of precise and detailed security mechanisms. Finally, SysML-Sec combines software/hardware codesign together with the handling of security concerns. We contend that this particular design objective is a key in the embedded system domain.

The SysML-Sec methodology adopts a three-phase approach that first deals with the system analysis, then with software design, and finally with system validation, as described in the following sections.

4 System Requirements Engineering and Analysis

The security requirement and threat analysis is mostly regarded as a preamble to risk analysis in IT systems. This process is generally meant to decide whether to introduce security countermeasures into the system, which means additional costs. In the case of embedded systems, we contend that the security analysis also has a strong impact on the system architecture and its realtime performance: the security requirements and threat analysis should thus be performed along the partitioning iterative process. We also claim that the security analysis should play an important role with respect to convincing the designer of increasingly complex embedded systems of the consistency and exhaustivity of his security architecture, at least with respect to the threats identified and to the risk model.

4.1 Iterative Security/System Codesign Process

System partitioning, security requirements, and threats are progressively refined based on one or several typical use cases. The following phases, which thus start with an initial architecture, are iterated in order to reach a satisfactory level of refinement:

Initial architecture mapping. The functionalities of the system highlighted in these use cases are first modeled as tasks. Exchanges between functions are modeled with information and event flows. Event-based communications is also captured in order to control the Information Flow. Tasks and communications can then be mapped to a draft
Architecture of the system. The designer’s experience plays a key role for determining the first draft of the architecture.

**Architecture analysis** System assets are identified among architectural elements (processors, pieces of software, sensors, hardware accelerators, communication channels). For instance, a modern automotive on-board network interconnects a hundred of microcontrollers, termed Electronic Control Units (ECUs) organized into application-specific domains that are bridged by gateways. It is easier to first refer to generic components, like for example: “all system buses”. When the architecture gets more detailed, assets are more likely to be refined into specific elements. The hardware/software partitioning and the function mapping adopted play a key role here in defining the type of asset at hand (and later on its vulnerabilities).

**Security concern identification.** Threats and security vulnerabilities of the selected assets originate from either real vulnerabilities or from a security analysis. For instance, attacks have been shown to be quite feasible \cite{KCR+10} in automotive systems by bypassing the filtering performed between domains or by brute-forcing ECU cryptography-based protection mechanisms. Those descriptions should as much as possible describe the capabilities that an attacker should meet or exceed and the origin of attacks (local, remote, through a specific interface). The SysML-Sec environment supports the assessment of risks following the approach described in more detail in the EVITA case study \cite{Rea09,HAF+}. We also implemented automated checks of the threat coverage by security objectives. Risk analysis is extremely important to determine whether attacks or vulnerabilities are relevant and to prioritize security objectives that address them. For instance, while the risk of exploiting the attacks mentioned above may seem negligible for an automobile, the increased communication capabilities of modern vehicles, like a permanent Internet connectivity, make them vulnerable to hackers and malware. Security objectives might originate (1) from security standards or properties expected from the system, or (2) from unaddressed threats or attacks on assets, or (3) from the refinement of another security objective when the process is iterated and the level of detail of the architecture has changed. In further iterations, one may need to update security objectives deprecated by changes in the architecture.

**Architecture refinement.** The architecture refinement originates from a more detailed description of the architecture components as the system and its usage become more precisely known (e.g., new communication channels, refinement of an execution environment into OS/middleware/application layers, etc.). It may also result from transitively mapping requirements to system information flows, which are often distributed among multiple hardware elements. The refinement phase may fail if the architecture and security requirements are incompatible, for instance, if the performance overhead of security mechanisms is too high. Consistency checks should also be performed to ensure that a security objective does not conflict with another requirement expressed over the same asset. A failure is the sign that the analysis should be backtracked to the previous stage of refinement.

### 4.2 Diagrams

In our proposed framework, the partitioning is given using the allocations of tasks over hardware nodes. Tasks and hardware nodes are modeled using SysML blocks. Allocations are modeled with the StsyML "allocate" relationship.
Security requirements are modeled in SysML Requirement Diagrams (see Figure 1). The main operators of such diagrams are Requirement Containment and Derive Dependency formalisms used to define relationships between requirements. The containment relationship depicts sub-requirements in terms of hierarchy and enables a complex requirement to be decomposed into its containing child requirements whereas deriveReqt determines the multiple derived requirements that support a source requirement. These requirements normally present the next level in the requirement hierarchy. A Security Requirement stereotype is introduced to make a clear distinction between functional requirements and security requirements of the system, yet modeling both functional and non-functional requirements in a single environment. Furthermore, a Kind parameter is defined to specify the category of the security requirement (confidentiality, access control, integrity, freshness, etc.).

Attacks trees can be modeled with slightly customized SysML Parametric Diagrams (see Figure 2). Attacks are modeled as values embedded into blocks representing the target of the attack. Attacks can be linked together with the logical constraints, like OR and AND, as well as temporal ones, like AFTER, the latter which we consider as extremely important to describe attacks in embedded systems. Their instances in different parametric diagrams can be linked together in order to assess the impact of a specific vulnerability and the need to address it at the risk assessment phase. An attack can also be tagged as a root attack, meaning that this attack is at the top of the tree. Last but not least,
attacks can be linked to requirements, thus allowing an automated check of the coverage of attacks.

**Fig. 3:** Mapping of Local Danger Warning use case (SysML-Sec)

An example of function mapping is given in Figure 3 in the scope of the emergency braking (or Local Danger Warning) use case. Two Electronic Control Unit sub-domains are represented. The *Chassis Safety Controller* on the left, and the *Body Electronic Module* on the right. Each sub-domain has a main processor, a local flash memory, a local main memory, a set of hardware accelerators, and a bridge to the main system bus. Functions are mapped either on processors (these functions are to be software-implemented) or on hardware accelerators (functions are to be hardware-coded). Communications between tasks are also to be mapped over buses and memories, in order to highlight data transfers.

5 Software Design

5.1 Methodological Aspects

Software design defines the architecture and behaviour of all functions mapped over processor nodes at the partitioning stage. From a security point of view, the design intends to precise how security requirements can be fulfilled with security-oriented software mechanisms executed on top of the hardware architecture defined in the partitioning stage, and verify that requirements identified during the partitioning phase are really satisfied by this design. Requirements expressed at partitioning are informal and refer to assets: they therefore need to be refined until their expression directly relates to design elements (e.g., attributes, methods, exchanged messages, states, etc.). Once refined, they constitute the security properties that are to be verified by the design. SysML-Sec extends SysML with ways to explicitly model security mechanisms and properties.

5.2 Security Design Extensions

A SysML-Sec design is made upon SysML block and state machine diagrams, extended with several features, and formally defined in pi-calculus (a process algebra). Figure 4 illustrates the SysML-Sec software design of the Key Distribution protocol defined...
in the EVITA architecture. This protocol distributes session keys in a group of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) spread in the vehicle. Pragmas are given in the top left part of the diagram: the knowledge which is pre-shared between ECUs and the Key Master (KM), and two properties: the confidentiality of the key pre-shared with ECU1, and the authenticity of a message sent from ECU1 to KM. The blocks underneath model the ECU initiating the key distribution (ECU1), the Key Master, and another ECU (ECUN). Extensions of SysML on these diagrams are now further explained.

5.2.1 Communication

We assume a Dolev-Yao attacker model, that is, only messages exchanged between blocks can be eavesdropped, contrary to attributes of blocks. That attacker model is enough to describe attacks on the protocols deployed between the components of the embedded system, from outside or within the system. It however does not aim at capturing physical attacks on the hardware, nor a sequence of exploitation of vulnerabilities of several components. Since communication channels may have been mapped over secure or non secure buses at partitioning stage, we give the possibility to tag links between blocks with a public label if an attacker can eavesdrop, or with a private label otherwise.

5.2.2 Cryptographic Material

Cryptographic material refers to all elements of the design that constitutes the basics upon which security mechanisms can be built on, for example cryptographic protocols. SysML does not explicitly support cryptographic material. In particular, three elements are at stake to model security mechanisms:

- **Cryptographic-related data types.** Thus, SysML-Sec defines security-oriented data types, e.g., the `Key` data type, see the top right part of Figure 4.

- **Cryptographic functions.** SysML-Sec defines the notion of "crypto block". A crypto block includes a set of cryptographic methods that can be used in the state
machines of those blocks, and which semantics is taken into account when verifying
security properties. The declaration of cryptographic methods can be seen in bloc
ECUN in Figure 4

• **Shared data.** Some security mechanisms assume the pre-sharing of data, e.g.,
  secret keys. Object-oriented models do not support that scheme, and so, we have
  introduced two specific pragmas for that purpose:

  1. **InitialSessionKnowledge** lists a set of block attributes whose values are identical
     at the beginning of a cryptographic protocol session.

     `# InitialSessionKnowledge BlockID.attribute
     [BlockID.attribute]*`

  2. **InitialSystemKnowledge** lists a set of block attributes whose values are identical
     at system startup. This pragma is used several times in Figure 4 in order to
     settle the pre-shared keys between the Key Master and the ECUs.

     `# InitialSystemKnowledge BlockID.attribute
     [BlockID.attribute]*`

### 5.3 Security Properties

A dedicated language has been defined for describing the commonly complex safety prop-
erties, which is based on SysML Parametric diagrams [KAD11]. On the contrary, security
properties can usually be defined with a type (e.g., confidentiality), and with design el-
ements related to that kind (e.g., the confidentiality of the attribute of a block). This
simplicity pleads for a basic modeling solution, that is not based on complex diagrams
or operators. Our solution relies on **pragmas** provided in notes of Block Diagrams: confidentiality and authenticity can be directly expressed at this level. The confidentiality
pragmas states that the value of the attribute of a block shall remain confidential, that
is, that value should never be disclosed to an attacker. For example, in Figure 4 the
attribute SesK of ECU1 must remain confidential. The pragma is as follows:

`# Confidentiality block.attribute`

The authenticity pragma states that a message $m_2$ received by a block $block_2$ was
necessarily sent before in a message $m_1$ by a block $block_1$. The following examples describes such a situation:

`# Authenticity block1.s1.m1 block2.s2.m2`

This authenticity pragma specifies two states: one of the sender block, i.e. one state
$s_1$ of block1, and one state $s_2$ of block2. Also, in the state machine diagram of block1, $s_1$
corresponds to the state right before the sending of $m_1$. Analogously, $s_2$ corresponds to the state right after message $m_2$ has been received and accepted as authentic. For example, in
Figure 4 the message msgauth received by KM before state decipherOK must have been
previously sent by ECU1 after the state makingFirstMessage and under the name msg.
6 System Validation

Validation can be performed from mapping models (e.g., performance evaluation of the selected hardware architecture: load of CPUs and buses), from design models (proof of safety and security properties), or from executable code automatically generated from design models (safety and security tests). Model transformations have been defined to transform SysML-Sec models into formal specifications. The whole process is seamlessly implemented in TTool, i.e., a user of TTool does not need to know about underlying formal techniques since model transformations and backtracing to models is totally automated. Proofs can be performed from partitioning or software design models. From partitioning models, it is possible to evaluate the impact of security mechanisms onto real-time constraints (e.g., latencies). From SysML-Sec designs, the formal proof relies on ProVerif [Bla09] for security properties.

Figure 5 depicts the successful verification in TTool of the confidentiality and authenticity properties modeled in Figure 4. While we can specify any security requirement, we currently only support the formal validation of those that can be expressed with these two security properties.

![TTool assistant for the formal verification of confidentiality and authenticity properties](image)

**Fig. 5:** TTool assistant for the formal verification of confidentiality and authenticity properties defined at Figure 4

7 Related Work

7.1 Requirements Analysis and System Architecture

Model-Driven Engineering is probably the main contribution of the last decade in modeling approaches. Profiles have also been defined by the OMG to more specifically address embedded systems: SPT [OMG05] and MARTE [VdLG+09], but none of them addresses requirements modeling nor security. Conversely, the SysML OMG profile [OMG12] clearly takes into account requirements with explicit modeling capabilities and diagrams, but ignores some problematics inherent to embedded systems, e.g., the partitioning issue, and security issues are not at all explicit in SysML.
It is worth mentioning that the model-driven engineering of requirements has long been supported by researchers in the field of embedded systems \cite{Bro97, vdBBRS02, GGS06}. However, only Peraldi et al. \cite{PFA10} advocate the need to link the model driven engineering of the system architecture and a goal-oriented expression of requirements that we follow in our approach. To our knowledge, none of these proposals has addressed the expression of security requirements.

Our approach shares some similarities with the TwinPeaks approach advocated by Nuseibeh \cite{Nus01}, although the latter does not address hardware systems. Instead of a simple spiral alternating between the requirements and the architecture as TwinPeaks suggests, we alternate between the Y-Chart modelling of software and its mapping to hardware components, the identification of assets and threats to them, and the identification of security requirements. In particular, we also deal with the three management concerns that TwinPeaks aims at addressing: (1) exploring the solution space (in our case, both the embedded system architecture and attacks that may result out of this design) early makes it possible to incrementally provide feedback about requirements; (2) the designer has to rely on commercial off-the-shelf software (as for TwinPeaks), or available electronic components, or standard cryptographic algorithms and requirements (security requirements in our proposal) help narrow down their proper selection; (3) rapid change, which is also very much linked with refining the architecture in our case.

Furthermore, this iterative approach we follow also aims at achieving a viable design. Other researchers have also argued that requirements engineering was about achieving a satisfactory tradeoff between security requirements as well as functional or other non-functional requirements \cite{EY07, HGJF07, Lee11, AGM11}. By introducing security requirements into the SysML framework, we also make it possible to relate them to other types of requirements with the support of our model-driven tools (e.g., \cite{WWZ10} or \cite{AB12}). Some of these validations can be described even at the goal level description of security requirements through the use of SysML testcases.

### 7.2 Security Requirements Engineering

In \cite{NNY10}, Nhabatsi et al. classify security requirements engineering work in software systems into four categories, namely: (1) goal-based approaches, (2) Model-based approaches, (3) problem-oriented approaches, and (4) Process-oriented approaches. Our own approach combines a goal-based description of security requirements with a model-driven engineering of the system architecture and validation of the soundness of the security properties or of their innocuity with respect to safety.

**Goal-based approaches** are intrinsically very close to the security analyst refinement process during system design, which we believe is a reason for their success and wide use in security and in other domains of requirement engineering. Another strength of goal oriented approaches lies in their ability to capture dependencies between security requirements; however, how those dependencies may evolve when security requirements are refined is generally ignored by those approaches, which generally lack any architectural support. The KAOS framework \cite{Van07} was the first such approach to feature a goal oriented approach for modeling, specifying, and analyzing security requirements, and making use of generic refinement patterns to decompose goals into a set of sub-goals. \cite{DvL96} further features a formalization of KAOS requirements definitions using linear time temporal logic. This representation makes use of generic refinement patterns to decompose goals.
into a set of sub-goals.

In contrast, **model-based approaches** like UMLSec [Jür02] focus on the mapping of security mechanisms to the software architecture. This approach follows a much finer-grained level of design, and its application is very useful for guiding the security designer’s implementation, especially for the design of cryptographic protocols. However, this level of abstraction means that it generally lacks feature to rationalize and ensure the traceability of requirements in the design achieved. Furthermore, this approach generally relies on the availability of a complete functional architecture: this may in itself either result in a limited design space exploration or in some expensive redesign of the system if security mechanisms don’t fit the implementation.

**Problem-oriented approaches**, like abuse frames [LNI+03] or misuse cases [SO00], focus on the expression of threats and attacks and how security requirements can be extracted from them. Those approaches especially fail to express security interoperability requirements, or information flow centric security requirements. However, the expression of attacks can be very precious to pinpoint a vulnerability of a system, where it plays the role of a counter-example.

**Process-oriented approaches**, like the SQUARE [MS05] methodology, finally aim mainly at the risk analysis of an existing design and follow a rather rigid waterfall approach to engineering, yet do not address well design exploration and refinement.

### 7.3 Security Mechanisms and Proofs

UMLsec [Jür02], which features a model-based approach as described above, defines how to integrate security protocol descriptions and security properties to a UML framework. However, design elements and security properties are mixed on the same diagrams, as well as functional and non functional requirements.

Assessing security in embedded systems mostly relies on formal approaches. For example, [Tou93] proposes to verify cryptographic protocols with a probabilistic analysis approach. [DTBJB95] defines a formal basic set of security services for accomplishing security goals, and it is therefore focusing on security mechanisms rather than security requirements. In this approach, the security property analysis strongly relies on the designer’s experience. Moreover, a threat assessment is not easily feasible. In more recent efforts, [DBTS04] embeds a first order Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover, thus making it possible to model both a system and its security properties, but unfortunately leading to non-easily reusable specific models. [MP08] mixes formal and informal security properties, but the overall verification process is not completely automated, again requiring specific skills.

### 8 Conclusion and Future Work

The complexity of embedded systems and time-to-market and software-engineering con- traits plead for engineering security requirements with user-oriented tools featuring automated and simplified verification. Our proposal, SysML-Sec, specifically addresses that need at the diverse phases of system design and development. It is based on a popular and friendly language (OMG’s SysML) and supported by an open-source toolkit (TTool) that relies on a recognized security verification toolkit. We have also developed a methodology for the use of SysML-Sec diagrams which has been experimented to define a secure
automotive embedded system in the scope of the EVITA European project.

We now plan to further investigate the question of the validation of requirements. We have already experimented with assessing how safety is possibly impacted by the security mechanisms introduced after security requirements, like for instance, assessing the added latency for performing a braking operation with secure communication. There as well, the use of an architecture-centric model of the system makes it more obvious to proceed to tests and simulations. We are also investigating how to automate the application of our methodology. In particular, such an automation will require the introduction of security-oriented reasoning capabilities into our modeling environment.

References


9 Biography

Ludovic Apvrille obtained his M.Sc. in Computer Science, Network and Distributed Systems specialization in 1998 from ENSEIRB and ISAE. He then completed a Ph.D. in 2002, in the Department of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science at ISAE, in collaboration with LAAS-CNRS and Alcatel Space Industries (now, Thalès Alenia Space). After a postdoctoral term at Concordia University (Canada), he joined LabSoc in 2003 as an assistant professor at Telecom ParisTech, in the Communication and Electronics department. He obtained his HDR (Habilitation à Diriger les Recherches) in 2012. His research interests focus on tools and methods for the modeling and verification of embedded systems and Systems-on-Chip. Verification techniques target both safety and security properties. He is leading the development efforts around the open-source UML/SysML.
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