Bootstrapping Security Associations in Opportunistic Networks

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Abstract—Key management in opportunistic networks is a challenging problem that cannot be solved with existing solutions. In this paper, we analyze the requirements of key management in the framework of opportunistic networks and content-based forwarding. We then present a specific key management scheme that enables the bootstrapping of local, topology-dependent security associations between a node and its neighbors along with the discovery of the neighborhood topology, thanks to the use of pseudonym certificates and encapsulated signatures. This key management solution relies on two phases: a first phase where nodes are connected to an Identity Manager that provides them with unique pseudonyms to prevent Sybil attacks, and a second phase where the opportunistic communication and the security associations bootstrapping take place without the need for the Identity Manager. This solution with an offline Identity Manager is well-suited to opportunistic networks and can be used as an anchor to provide end-to-end confidentiality based on local and self-organized key management.

Keywords—opportunistic networks; pairwise key management; peer-to-peer key management; security associations.

I. INTRODUCTION

Opportunistic networking ([6], [8]) is a new paradigm aiming at enabling communication through highly heterogeneous networks using different communication technologies. In opportunistic networks, mobility and disconnections are the rule rather than the exception, therefore opportunistic networks are delay-tolerant by nature. The lack of end-to-end connectivity is a key difference between such networks and Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs). This major constraint implies that it is impossible to establish an end-to-end path from source to destination and forwarding decisions are taken based only on a local view of the network.

Furthermore, opportunistic networks are more general than MANETs, because disseminational communication is the rule rather than conversational communication. A concept that nicely fits with the disseminational networking model is offered by content-based communication ([3], [4]) whereby messages are forwarded from source to destinations based on their content instead of explicit addresses.

In content-based applications nodes declare their interests through receiver advertisements and simply publish content that they wish to disseminate, rather than explicitly defining destination nodes for packets. Intermediate nodes set up and update their forwarding tables based on the receiver advertisements, and take forwarding decisions implicitly by looking up published content in their forwarding table.

The flexibility of content-based opportunistic networks come on the other hand with a high cost in increased exposure in terms of data security. Security services and in particular key management should be revisited to reflect the characteristics of such networks; in particular security services should also be flexible and self-organized. Moreover, privacy protection is particularly challenging due to the content-based messaging paradigm. The protection of the content with classical security mechanisms would indeed conflict with the forwarding functions since the latter rely on the very content that is being transmitted for their basic operations. An interesting idea to meet the privacy requirements of content-based forwarding in opportunistic networks consists of multiple layer commutative encryption (MLCE) that allows to perform secure operations on encrypted content as proposed in [10], [11]. When using MLCE, one needs to encrypt the data with several layers of encryption corresponding to \( r \) next hops. Such a solution therefore calls for an innovative key management scheme that should ensure local and self-organized security associations between a node and its neighborhood: each node should share a key with all its neighbors that are less than \( r \) hops away. The key management should thus depend heavily on the neighborhood topology which is fundamental for the multi-layer encryption scheme to work properly. Because of the lack of infrastructure, this also means that the neighborhood topology itself should be securely discovered.

The main goal of our work is therefore to propose a local, self-organized and topology-dependent bootstrapping of security associations along with a secure neighborhood discovery. In order to optimize the performance of the scheme, and to cope with the dependency between topology and security, it is indeed more efficient to perform both neighborhood discovery and security associations with all \( r \)-hops neighbors together rather than in two separate steps. We achieve this goal by using an authenticated version of
Diffie-Hellman key agreement together with encapsulated signatures that protect the integrity of key management messages at each hop. Moreover, since the security of MLCE is directly linked to the number of consecutive colluding nodes, it is important to guarantee that each node can claim only one identity and only one position in the neighborhood. Creation of bogus identities through Sybil attacks would then be a crucial threat against which our scheme is protected thanks to the introduction of an offline Identity Manager.

In this paper, we first analyze the new security challenges regarding key management in the context of opportunistic networks and extract important requirements for key management in this context. We then present a self-organized and local mechanism that bootstraps security associations with the discovery of the neighborhood topology thanks to the use of certificates and signatures chains. The proposed scheme relies on two phases: a first step where nodes are connected to an Identity Manager that provides them with unique pseudonyms, and a second step where the opportunistic communication takes place and where there is no need for the Identity Manager. The pseudonyms are not used as certified identities but only serve the purpose of withstanding Sybil attacks. Due to lack of space, the presentation here is a little rough but we refer to [9] for more detailed and more complete explanations.

II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Privacy in content-based opportunistic networks

As mentioned in the introduction, content-based forwarding solutions raise entirely new privacy concerns: since nodes may not want to reveal the content of packets to entities other than destination(s), forwarding decisions should be taken over encrypted information. In order to meet the conflicting requirements between forwarding and privacy in content-based opportunistic networks, Shikfa et al. propose in [10] to use multiple commutative encryption layers: packets are encrypted with multiple keys where each of them is shared by a different pair of nodes. This scheme provides both end-to-end confidentiality and the possibility for intermediate nodes to securely compare published content and encrypted interests on the fly.

Even though it is impossible to establish an end-to-end path between source and destination, it is assumed that nodes can determine the $r$ next hops with a local knowledge of the network. Each node establishes a secure channel with nodes that are $r$ hops away. Moreover, the proposed scheme is commutative in the sense that $\{\{m\}_{k_1}\}_{k_2} = \{\{m\}_{k_2}\}_{k_1}$, thus layers can be removed in any order.

While sending a new packet, the source first encrypts it $r$ times with $r$ different keys, each of them being shared with one of the $r$ next hops. Thanks to the commutativity of the encryption scheme, whenever an intermediate node receives an encrypted packet, it first removes one layer of encryption, and then compares the encrypted form of receiver advertisements and published content to take a forwarding decision. Before forwarding the packet, in order to ensure the confidentiality at the same level, the same intermediate node adds another encryption layer using the key that is shared with its $r$th next hop. By removing old encryption layers and replacing them with the new ones, the same confidentiality degree is always ensured based on only a local knowledge of the network. The security of the scheme strongly depends on this $r$ parameter: $r$ consecutive colluding nodes can reveal the content of a packet.

In [10], [11] where MLCE is proposed and described, the problem of key management is overlooked. We address this problem by analyzing first the general requirements of key management in the context of opportunistic networks and then the more specific requirements of topology-dependent key management, in order to come up with a complete solution dedicated to MLCE.

B. Key management: Requirements and threats

On the one hand, the lack of end-to-end connectivity has strong implications on the problem of key management as well. Indeed, nodes cannot establish end-to-end security associations nor rely on an online, centralized authority or security server. Although identity-based cryptographic tools would be a good candidate for opportunistic networks because they do not require certificates (and they are used by Asokan et al. in [1] in this context), they are not suitable for content-based forwarding. Indeed, in content-based forwarding messages are forwarded depending on their content and the interests advertised by nodes, therefore the (set of) destination is unknown at the source.

On the other hand, the security of MLCE strongly depends on the location of the nodes in the topology. Indeed, nodes need to establish pairwise keys with all nodes that are at most $r$ hops away. Given the layered structure, the assurance of privacy strongly depends on the position of the nodes in terms of hop-distance: the key agreement scheme should therefore depend on the topology of the neighborhood which needs to be securely discovered because of the lack of infrastructure. Securely discovering the neighborhood topology in turn requires security services because nodes should guarantee their hop-distance to their neighbors and should not be able to claim fake distances which would have an impact on the security of MLCE. In order to take into account the dependency between network topology and security, and in order to avoid running two separate protocols, security associations should be locally bootstrapped along with a lightweight neighborhood discovery solution.

Moreover, nodes can launch Sybil attacks [5] by simulating many different identities claiming different hop distances. In this case, one malicious node simulating $r$ identities and claiming different positions for each identity would receive one key per layer and would therefore decrypt the content of packets although it does not have the right to.
Hence, a global mechanism that associates each node with a unique unspoofable identity (pseudonym) is required.

Finally, as with the design of any communication protocol, the key management protocol should consider the regular attacks which can be classified as follows:

- **Passive attacks**: malicious nodes do not take part in the forwarding process but they eavesdrop on communication. Therefore protocol messages should be encrypted.
- **Active attacks**: malicious nodes can modify packets or launch replay or man-in-the-middle attacks. In the particular case of key management in MLCE, the goal of active attackers is to discover a key by establishing security associations with a legitimate node without complying with the local topology. Attacks aiming only at disrupting the protocol (e.g. pollution) with no security advantage, are out of the scope of this paper.

To summarize, content-based opportunistic networking requires a local and self-organized key management mechanism. Nodes should establish key pairs with all nodes which are at most \( r \) hops away. This implies that nodes should be able to determine the position of their neighbors and thus security associations should be bootstrapped along with neighborhood discovery. Moreover, as with any network protocol, the new key management mechanism should be protected against regular network attacks.

III. OUR SOLUTION

In order to meet the requirements detailed in the previous section, we propose a solution for bootstrapping security associations which features two phases. Indeed, nodes require anchors to be uniquely identified in the network, and each node should have only one valid anchor to prevent Sybil attacks. Therefore, we propose first a setup phase, during which nodes are connected to an Identity Manager (IM) that generates and distributes these anchors in the form of certificates. The keying material received during this phase can be considered as long-term keying material that allows the computation of short-term keys resulting from the establishment of security associations in a secure way.

During the regular network operations, nodes do not need to communicate with the Identity Manager anymore and the long term keys are not used by the application. We hereafter describe these two phases in detail.

A. Setup phase

During the setup phase, nodes contact an IM, which is a lightweight security server that generates pseudonyms and certificates on-the-fly but does not manage certificates as in classical public key infrastructures. For the sake of clarity, we assume the existence of a single Identity Manager (IM), but the infrastructure could be more sophisticated with a distributed architecture for example. The IM generates a public/private key pair \( pk_{IM}/sk_{IM} \), and \( pk_{IM} \) is known by all nodes. The role of the IM is twofolds:

1) **Enforcing privacy**: in opportunistic networks real identities are meaningless because most of the nodes which are encountered by a given node \( N_i \) are unknown to \( N_i \). Hence, using actual identities incurs a privacy threat with no additional advantage.

2) **Prevention of Sybil attacks**: The IM links the pseudonym to a real identity and a public/private key pair and certifies it. Indeed, even though identities are meaningless, nodes should be restrained to a unique pseudonym otherwise they could have several identities, which would lead to Sybil attacks: a node could then pretend to be at several positions at the same time, and therefore break the multi-layer scheme.

To fulfill these tasks, each node \( N_i \) first generates a public/private key pair \( pk_i/sk_i \) and then sends \( pk_i \) to the IM. The IM first verifies that \( N_i \) owns the associated private key with a challenge-response exchange, and then requests the node for some information \( I_i \) to uniquely identify \( N_i \). The requested set of information remains the same for all nodes at anytime (e.g. full name, date and place of birth) and is thoroughly verified by the IM (with the help of official documents like ID card or passport for example). The IM uses this set of information \( I_i \) together with a master key \( K \) (known only by the IM) in a message authentication code (MAC) function to generate a pseudonym for the node:

\[
P_i = MAC(I_i, K).
\]

The IM then provides \( N_i \) with a certificate \( C_i \) which links \( P_i \) with \( pk_i \), by signing these information:

\[
C_i = \{P_i, pk_i, signature_{sk_I}(P_i, pk_i)\}.
\]

Note that a node can obtain several certificates with different public keys, but all the certificates include the same pseudonym and can therefore not be used for Sybil attacks.

When the node \( N_i \) has retrieved its certificate \( C_i \), the setup phase ends and \( N_i \) can enter the runtime phase. During the runtime phase, communication is supposed to be delay-tolerant, therefore the IM is unreachable and secure communication should be possible without accessing the IM.

B. Bootstrapping local security associations

We now assume that all nodes have already performed the setup phase and own at least one certificate.

During this phase nodes need to establish ephemeral security associations with all their neighbors which are at distance less than \( r \) hops. As mentioned previously, this key agreement depends on the local topology and therefore requires a secure neighborhood discovery. In order to optimize the number of message exchanges and to cope with the dependency between security and topology, we propose a local key agreement protocol along with neighborhood discovery: one protocol run provides the initiator with both a correct view of its neighborhood topology at \( r \) hops distance and shared secrets with all \( r \)-hops or less neighbors.
in a batch. On the one hand, the neighborhood discovery mechanism is inspired by secure routing protocols (like [7]) with the noticeable difference that our solution is based on a hop count limit instead of targeting a destination: it therefore relies on signatures chains to guarantee the integrity of the discovered topology. Contrary to secure routing in MANET, the goal of our protocol is not to perform end-to-end secure routing which is irrelevant in opportunistic networks, but simply to discover the local topology of the network. On the other hand, the key agreement scheme is derived from an authenticated version of Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, also called the station to station protocol [13]. We therefore assume that all nodes know a group $G$ with generator $g$ suitable for a Diffie-Hellman protocol. All exponentiations are taken modulo the cardinal of the group $|G|$ and we do not mention this modular extraction in the sequel of the paper for the sake of clarity.

The protocol features four main steps. First a node initiates a Security Association Request for $r$ hops, this request is then forwarded to neighbors until the $r$-th hop receives it. Then, a Security Association Reply is sent to the initiator through the reverse path of the request and finally the initiator can compute the shared keys.

1) Initiation of Security Association Request: When a node $N_i$ wants to establish security associations with its neighbors, at distance less than $r$ hops, it initiates a Security Association Request. It first computes its Diffie-Hellman share $g^{r_i}$ in order to establish short term keys with each of the neighbors. In order to prevent impersonation, $N_s$ also sends its certificate received from IM during the previous phase. Finally, since the neighborhood discovery message should not be forwarded after the $r$-th hop, an additional iterator is included in the message and is decremented at each hop. $N_s$ signs all these information to prove their authenticity and broadcast the following message:

$$<SARq,r,\sigma_s,\sigma_s>.$$  

$SARq$ is simply an identifier standing for Security Association Request and $\sigma_s$ is a signature of the whole message:

$$\sigma_s = signature_{sk_s}(SARq,r,\sigma_s,g^{r_i}).$$

2) Processing and forwarding of Security Association Requests: Upon receiving a Security Association Request, an intermediate node $N_i$ first verifies the authenticity of the initial message and then $N_i$ processes the Security Association Request. In order to prove that it is on the path of the request and validate its hop distance, it builds on the received message by adding its certificate and by decrementing the iterator. It also generates its Diffie-Hellman share and includes it in the message, and signs the modified message: this produces a sequence of encapsulated signatures which validates the integrity of the message at each step. Thus, the general form of a Security Association Request contains three lists gradually filled in by intermediate nodes:

$$<SARq,remaining\_hop\_count,Certificate\_list,\ DH\_share\_list,signature\_list>.$$  

More precisely, $N_i$ first checks the authenticity of the initial request message by verifying the signature of the initiator. The initial request message is indeed:

$$<SARq,r,first\(Certificate\_list\),first\(DH\_share\_list\),first\(signature\_list\)>$$

where first(.) designates the first element in a list. $r$ is computed as the addition of $remaining\_hop\_count$ and the number of elements in the lists minus one. Then, the initial signature is checked thanks to the public key of the initiator which can be found in $first\(Certificate\_list\)$.

If the signature is valid, the intermediate node $N_i$ processes the request as follows:

- $remaining\_hop\_count$ is decreased by one.
- $N_i$ appends its own certificate $C_i$ to $Certificate\_list$ in order to give a proof of its pseudonym $P_i$ and to provide its public key $pk_i$.
- $N_i$ needs to provide a Diffie-Hellman share for the key agreement, hence $N_i$ draws a random number $r_i$ and then appends $g^{r_i}$ to $DH\_share\_list$.
- $N_i$ needs to prove the integrity and authenticity of the modified request therefore it computes a signature $\sigma_i$ of the modified message plus a random number $\rho_i$:

$$\sigma_i = signature_{sk_i}(ND,remaining\_hop\_count,Certificate\_list,DH\_share\_list,\rho_i)$$

and appends $\sigma_i$ to $signature\_list$.

$\rho_i$ is a random number that is revealed in the Security Association Reply as described in the next section. This random number guarantees that the reply returns through $N_i$; if the reply do not pass through $N_i$ then $\sigma_i$ cannot be verified and therefore the message is considered as not valid.

After this processing, the message is broadcasted, or a unicast reply message is sent back to the initiator through the same path if the message reached the $r$-th hop.

3) Security Association Reply: The reply has to follow the reverse path from which the discovery request has been forwarded, therefore the iterator is no longer needed. The reply mainly consists of the list of certificates, signatures and Diffie-Hellman shares at the last hop of the request. Furthermore, intermediate nodes $N_i$ that receive back the reply, need to reveal the random number $\rho_i$ they used in the request to allow the verification of their signature. Therefore the general format of the reply is:

$$<SARp,Certificate\_list,DH\_share\_list,signature\_list,random\_number\_list>.$$
SARp is an identifier for the reply and random_number_list corresponds to the list of random numbers used during the signatures of request messages.

The processing of reply messages by intermediate nodes is simple. Upon receiving a reply message, an intermediate node \( N_i \) first checks that it was on the request path, by looking for its own certificate \( C_i \) in Certificate_list and then appends the random number \( \rho_i \) it chose to random_number_list. Then \( N_i \) forwards the message to the next hop as listed in the Certificate_list.

4) Key computation: When the reply finally gets back to the initiator of the neighborhood discovery \( N_s \), \( N_s \) thoroughly verifies its validity by checking that:

1) the number of elements in Certificate_list, \( DH\_share\_list \), signature_list is equal to \( r + 1 \) while the number of elements of random_number_list is equal to \( r \),

2) all the certificates in Certificate_list are related to different users (the pseudonyms should all be different) and valid (the signature of the IM on each certificate should be valid),

3) all the signatures in signature_list are valid. To do so, the initiator reconstructs the message at each hop and verifies the validity of the signature at each step by taking into account the corresponding random number listed in random_number_list.

If all these verifications succeed, \( N_s \) and the nodes listed in the message compute their shared keys. The key shared with \( N_i \) is computed as \((g^{r_{\ast}})^{s_i} \) by \( N_s \) and as \((g^{r_{\ast}})^{s_i} \) by \( N_i \).

Note that, for one Security Association Request, the initiator should receive many replies, one per possible \( r \)-hop path. Thanks to this mechanism, the initiator can fully construct its \( r \)-hop neighborhood topology and establish security associations with all the nodes in this neighborhood.

C. Evaluation

In the previous sections, we presented a complete mechanism to bootstrap security associations along with neighborhood discovery. The proposed mechanism is local and self-organized and therefore complies with the delay-tolerant nature of opportunistic networks.

The mechanism relies on two phases: a setup phase where nodes have access to the IM and the runtime phase where the opportunistic communication actually takes place. The proposed IM has a completely different role than classical Certification authorities. The role of the IM is not to certify identities, it just certifies that a given node has one and only one pseudonym. The pseudonym itself has no significance and it is not used as an identity in further communications, its only role is to guarantee that a node cannot impersonate other nodes. Furthermore, the IM is lightweight by design because it does not need to keep track of the certificates it delivered. Each time a node asks for a certificate, the IM generates the associated pseudonym on-the-fly by requesting the same information, and the resulting pseudonym is always the same for the same node, therefore each node can only have one pseudonym. During networking operations, the Identity Manager is not required anymore and the proposed scheme enables local and self-organized security associations.

We now evaluate the security of the complete mechanism first against eavesdropping and then against active attackers.

Since the establishment of security associations is based on the Diffie-Hellman exchange protocol, eavesdropping is inherently prevented thanks to the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm and the Diffie-Hellman Problems [13].

However, since the message exchange is not performed by only two nodes, the security guarantee offered by the Diffie-Hellman protocol is not sufficient, especially in the presence of active attackers. Man-in-the-middle attacks first are effectively prevented by the use of an authenticated version of the Diffie-Hellman exchange protocol that adds signatures computed over key shares. Indeed, no node can forge a network discovery request initiated by node \( N_s \) because it requires the private key of \( N_s \).

In fact the mechanism of encapsulated signatures prevents most basic active attacks, and makes tampering of Security Association messages difficult:

- Encapsulated signatures in security association requests protect the integrity of messages at each step. Therefore an intermediate node cannot forge the message of a previous node, in particular it cannot change the value of an iterator at a previous step, nor can it modify the value of the Diffie-Hellman share. An intermediate node can only undo some steps to remove some nodes from the path and extend the neighborhood discovery hops in a grayhole attempt. But in this case the deleted nodes will not accept to forward the reply because their certificates are not in the certificate list anymore.

- The mechanism also ensures that the path of the reply is the reverse of the request thanks to the use of the random numbers \( \rho_i \). Indeed the signatures in the request messages cannot be verified if the \( \rho_i \) are not revealed and nodes only reveal them in reply messages if they were involved in the request path. An alternative solution would be to sign all the reply messages, but this would be more costly.

Wormhole attacks that completely circumvent the deleted nodes and avoid message discarding can be successful and the source node would end up with a fake neighborhood topology in that it would contain nodes which are more than \( r \)-hops away. The impact of this attack is however the same as the collusion attack in MLCE: if \( r \) consecutive nodes collude they can break the scheme and access encrypted messages. Hence, it is possible to mitigate this attack by increasing the security parameter \( r \), which is chosen according to the expected maximum number of consecutive malicious nodes. Furthermore, we assume that nodes can securely determine their one-hop neighbors by
using distance bounding techniques ([2], [12]), which further mitigates the wormhole threat.

Furthermore, as previously explained, thanks to the initialization phase whereby nodes communicate with the Identity Management system in order to get identity certificates, the proposed mechanism is automatically protected against Sybil attacks. Indeed, since the pseudonym of a node is strongly linked with its real identity, malicious nodes cannot simulate multiple nodes and thus cannot access any private message they are not authorized to.

Finally, we briefly evaluate the performance of the scheme. The scheme requires asymmetric cryptography and signatures to guarantee the local neighborhood topology. Nevertheless, the design of the mechanism takes into account the need to minimize the number of signatures. The use of the random numbers $p_i$ serves this purpose, since it avoids signing both requests and replies, and enables the signature of requests only. Therefore intermediate nodes have to verify and to compute only one signature each, while the initiator has to verify only $r$ signatures. The message length is roughly the size of the three main lists $Certificate_list, DH_share_list, signature_list$ which contain at most $r + 1$ elements each, and in each of these elements the most important component has a size of 1024 bits. The message length is therefore linear in $r$.

It is worth noticing that the proposed protocol is not used for routing, but to bootstrap security associations from scratch. The proposed scheme can therefore be used as an anchor for further efficient key management based on these security associations. Using asymmetric cryptography to bootstrap security associations is a widely accepted concept, hence performance is not a critical issue for the mechanism.

IV. Conclusion

The analysis of the characteristics of opportunistic networks and content-based forwarding, lead us to the conclusion that key management in such networks should be self-organized and local. This locality also involves a correct view of the neighborhood topology. We therefore designed a complete solution that enables bootstrapping of security associations along with secure neighborhood discovery.

This solution based on pseudonym certificates and encapsulated signature enables key agreement between a node (the initiator) and all its neighbors which are at distance less than $r$-hops without pre-established trust relationship or infrastructure. The solution also enables the discovery of the neighborhood’s topology and withstands tampering by malicious nodes. We also proposed the use of an Identity Manager which provides each node with a unique certified pseudonym during a setup phase. This lightweight IM therefore effectively prevents Sybil attacks. Furthermore the IM is offline and is not required during networking operations; therefore the key management scheme is self-organized.

The proposed scheme can therefore be used as an anchor to content based forwarding in opportunistic networks based on multiple layer commutative encryption, which results in end-to-end confidentiality and privacy-preserving content-based forwarding solely based on a local and self-organized key management.

References