Analysis of cooperation strategies in mobile ad hoc networks with imperfect monitoring
Research report RR-04-099
This paper focuses on the formal assessment of the properties of cooperation enforcement mechanisms used to detect and prevent selfish behavior of nodes forming a mobile ad hoc network. In the first part, we demonstrate the requirement for a cooperation enforcement mechanism using cooperative game theory that allows us to determine a lower bound on the size of coalitions of cooperating nodes. In the second part, using non-cooperative game theory, we compare our cooperation enforcement mechanism CORE to other popular mechanisms. Under the hypothesis of perfect monitoring of node behavior, CORE appears to be equivalent to a wide range of history-based strategies like tit-for-tat. Further, adopting a more realistic assumption taking into account imperfect monitoring due to probable communication errors, the non-cooperative model puts in evidence the superiority of CORE over other history-based schemes.
| Keywords: | cooperation enforcement;game theory;complex strategies;evolution of cooperation |
| Type: | Report |
| Language: | English |
| Date: | February 2004 |
| Department: | Networking and Security |
| Eurecom ref: | 1340 |
| Copyright: | © EURECOM. Personal use of this material is permitted. The definitive version of this paper was published in Research report RR-04-099 and is available at : |
| Bibtex: | @techreport{EURECOM+1340, year = {2004}, title = {{A}nalysis of cooperation strategies in mobile ad hoc networks with imperfect monitoring}, author = {{M}ichiardi, {P}ietro and {M}olva, {R}efik}, number = {EURECOM+1340}, month = {02}, institution = {Eurecom}, url = {http://www.eurecom.fr/publication/1340},, } |
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